1 post tagged “action”
I had a comment on my Faith and Certainty entry that was essentially, instead of “I have faith that X,” try “I act as though X is true.” For the observer, and we all are, the indications that someone has faith in one thing or another is found in how they act. A person’s thoughts are only meaningful to others when they are observed though the thinker’s actions.
This would seem to be an effective way of translating a very private thing into something that would be meaningful to the external observer. I can place my spare change on the dresser which is an act as though gravity is true and won’t allow the quarters and pennies to float away, and it could be said that my action was an indication of my faith that certain things will happen due to gravity. Or I can set my alarm in anticipation of the sun rising the next morning and that’s an act as though the earth spinning on its axis is true. I guess that could be translated to “I set the alarm having faith that the sun will rise tomorrow.”
But, is ‘acting as though X is true’ necessarily the same as ‘having faith that X?’ When I put my change on the dresser would anyone really say that that action indicated faith in gravity? If I were a dunce and had no knowledge of gravity, would I act any differently? Probably not, and this would mean that acting doesn’t necessarily indicate faith. And does faith necessarily result in acting a certain way? I don’t think so. Someone can proclaim profound faith and their actions wouldn’t reveal that faith in any way. For instance, there are those who claim faith in a young earth based on a literal understanding of the bible. Except for their statement that they have this faith, you may never realize it in their actions. It would be difficult to imagine someone saying, “they act as though the earth is 6,000 years old is true.” What would acting like that be like? Yet, we can’t deny that these adherents of a young earth have faith in the bible being the literal word of God.
All this gets to is that in at least some cases, having faith and acting as though something is true aren’t necessarily the same. We can talk about faith and it means something different, even if only slightly, than observing someone’s action.
What about language? Can the use of language be considered an “act as though something is true?” Certainly. This may be the only way that we know that a young earth adherent believes in the literal truth of the bible. They are, in fact, very vehement in their assertions regarding the truthfulness of the bible and falsity of reported scientific findings. So, yes, their act of linguistic vehemence could be an indicator of their faith. But now we get into a quandary of people acting as though any number of things is true. After all, people can say or write just about anything and claim it to be true. How would we treat statements of con artists and swindlers? I don’t think those with religious faith will admit their belief is as easily pliable as that.
Let’s replace X with a religious concept and see what that gives us.
1. Tom has faith that God created heaven and earth in six days.
2. Tom acts as though God created heaven and earth in six days is true.
For me, statement 2 is rather tough to imagine. What would acting in that way look like? Or how about these statements:
3. Tom has faith that God exists.
4. Tom acts as though God’s existence is true.
Again, I’m not sure what the action in statement 4 would look like. Going to church? What if Tom is an agnostic who accompanies his faithful wife to church and goes through all the same actions that she does in church to keep her happy? He may act as though God’s existence is true (because he’s a considerate husband), but we can’t say that’s his faith.
So, where have we gotten? I think we can say that how a person acts is a good indicator of their faith . . . but not the sole indicator. I think the whole point of the comment was that so called mental states are only meaningful to others when they're indicated by action. While I agree most of the time, I think one can equate what's being said about a mental state with one's own private experiences or reports of other people's mental states that makes what's being said about a private mental state meaningful. For instance, it's perfectly meaningful to me when you say "I believe in God" even though your actions could mean any number of things including that you believe in God. And understanding that you believe in God doesn't necessarily mean that I expect you to act in a certain way. I don't have a problem that you're making an observation of a private mental state and I understand it to be such. My concern is this--what is the nature of that private mental state and how does it compare to other private mental states, such as certainty that 1+1=2.
Wittgenstein would roll over in his grave.